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Abstract: Presenting evidence from a 19th century corporation, the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), the paper shows that
issues of corporate governance have existed since the first corporations were established in the U.S. The C&O used a stockholder review
committee to review the annual report of the president and directors.
The paper shows how the C&O stockholders used this committee to
supplement the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance structure of the C&O is also viewed from a theoretical structure
as espoused by Hart [1995].

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. approach to corporate governance is being challenged due to corporate failures in the early part of this decade
and the more recent decline in markets and the trading value of
corporate equity securities. These recent episodes have raised
public concern over corporate behavior in many areas such as
compensation, performance measurement, and accountability.
While these corporate failures have diverse consequences
and details, the conditions which enabled them can be related
to corporate governance failures. Evidence and theory available to the investor show that managerial discretion combined
with other incentives can cause managers to pursue personal
interests at the expense of the investor. In their discussion of
Acknowledgments: We express our appreciation to the anonymous reviewers and the editor, Richard Fleischman, for their comments and suggestions which
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corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny [1997] try to answer
the question of why investors part with their money in the face
of potential managerial misuse of the investment. Currently,
investors theoretically control management. In the 19th century,
stockholders were directly involved in the corporation and established governance procedures and policies for the protection
of their investments.
Hart [1995] provides a theoretical framework for corporate governance, describing the problem of incomplete agent
contracts and how corporate governance relates. Hart proposes
that if the agency problem exists and contracts are incomplete,
then the structure of corporate governance has a role and is
important. Five issues of corporate governance raised by Hart
are: cost of agent contracts; individual stockholders are too
numerous to exercise control on a day-to-day basis; large stockholders; limitations of the corporate board of directors; and
the potential that management will pursue its own goals at the
stockholders’ expense. Resulting from these issues, providers
of capital have designed systems of corporate governance with
checks and balances to protect their financial interests in the
corporation.
With methods of corporate governance and the success of
those methods today being questioned, this paper reviews corporate governance from an historical perspective. While several
studies [Roe, 1993; Charkham, 1994] have compared corporate
governance methods between countries, few have looked at corporate governance in history [Gallhofer and Haslam, 1993].
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Over the past several years, the structure of our corporate
governance system has come into question. At Enron, the board
of directors removed governance controls, allowing the CFO to
operate off-balance-sheet partnerships that greatly obscured
the true financial condition of the company. At Adelphia, the
president ignored the economic entity assumption and used the
assets of the company as his own. Before these companies faltered, some academics were already questioning our corporate
governance system. Hart [1995] and Shleifer and Vishny [1997]
published papers presenting evidence that there are flaws in the
corporate governance system upon which investors rely. Both of
these papers state the limitations of the corporate governance
system and potential problems associated with those limitations. Issues mentioned in both papers include agency problems
and large stockholders.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9

2

ss et al.: Corporate governance in the 19th century: Evidence from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Compa
Russ et al., The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company

115

As previously indicated, Hart proposed a framework of
corporate governance, maintaining that the market approach
to monitoring corporate governance theoretically should create
a good system of corporate governance that would work in all
cases. Hart argues that a market view should not need a statutory corporate governance structure, but that the limitations of
the market are not correcting all corporate governance issues.
As an example, he regards the historical separation of chief
executive and board chairman as a non-issue. However, one individual holding the position of both CEO and board chairman
at a company can provide sufficient power to base business decisions on personal incentives. The recent failures of the market
approach to corporate governance have led to statutory governance policies in the form of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Shleifer and Vishny [1997] in their discussion of corporate
governance make the observation that in lesser developed countries corporate governance is almost nonexistent. Undeveloped
countries today have the advantage of the ability to observe and
emulate the best practices of the developed world. By choosing
the best practices of each country, these countries can create
systems that are as good, if not better, than the systems currently
used in the economically developed world.
However, what can be said about the origins of corporate
governance? The earliest companies did not have the advantage
of others to emulate. Using historical examples, we can review
the development of our current corporate governance structures
and obtain additional insights into these systems. This paper
provides evidence that many of the current issues of corporate
governance existed in 19th century corporations. The paper
further illustrates how the issues raised by Hart are not new but
have been related to corporate governance since the first corporations chartered in the U.S. by providing evidence from the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O). The paper also
presents information about how the C&O addressed these issues
of corporate governance.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
On September 2, 1784, George Washington started a tour of
the western territories. Washington had large land holdings in
western Virginia, and the purpose of his trip was to examine his
land holdings, collect some money due him from tenants, and
other business dealings. Upon his return to Virginia, Washington
wrote a letter to Benjamin Harrison, governor of Virginia, on
October 10, 1784. In this letter, he noted that unless the colonies
Published by eGrove, 2009
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improved communication and trade with the western territories,
the loyalty of the people settling these territories would switch to
Spanish New Orleans. Washington suggested in this letter1 that
a method that could be used to improve communications was
to improve waterways between the coastal region of the country
and the Ohio Valley. Governor Harrison presented Washington’s
letter to the state legislature during that session. The legislature
granted Washington a corporate charter.
The corporation formed was the Potomac Company (PC).
Over the next three months, Washington worked to obtain a
similar charter from the State of Maryland. The PC was a river
improvement company and, as such, removed obstructions from
the river and built canals circumventing major falls. The PC had
exhausted its finances by 1820 with few improvements to show
for the expenditures of time and money. The navigational improvements undertaken by the PC proved to be inadequate for
the region and needs of the country.
During the War of 1812, communications and transportation needs became very apparent in the states. The State of
New York started construction of the Erie Canal in 1817 [Shaw
1966]. Once again, the Potomac route to the west was seen as a
commercial route. In 1823, a new group of individuals obtained
a charter from Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the federal government to form a new company. The new company, the
C&O, absorbed the assets, liabilities, and stockholders of the
PC. The goal of the new company was to build an artificial river
(canal) from tidewater Potomac to the Ohio River at Pittsburgh.
On July 4, 1828, the company broke ground in Georgetown (now
part of the District of Columbia) and commenced construction
paralleling the north bank of the Potomac River.
Congress appropriated funds for the Army Corps of Engineers to survey the route and prepare an estimate of construction for the canal in the amount of $22 million. The canal
promoters believed that this sum was far too great an amount
for the company to raise for construction. The canal promoters
secured a new estimate that predicted the canal could be built
for $4.5 million. The canal promoters accepted the lower number and proceeded with construction. Twenty-two years (18281
From the sending of this letter, the canal movement in the U.S. was born.
Individuals promoting the C&O and the Erie Canals [Shaw, 1966], as well as other
canal promoters, quote the letter from Washington to Harrison. The letter pre
sents Washington’s fears that without communication and trade, the western territories could become Spanish by virtue of trading with Spanish New Orleans.
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1850) and $18 million later, the company reached Cumberland,
Maryland. The distance from Georgetown to Cumberland was
184.5 miles. This distance was less than half the original route
planned to the Ohio River. Lack of funds for continued construction and the location of coal fields in the Cumberland area as a
source of revenue convinced company management to stop at
Cumberland.
Despite the fact that the C&O was never sufficiently profitable to pay off its corporate debt borrowed for construction and
repairs, the company was able to survive for over one hundred
years (including the predecessor PC). Although the canal did enjoy financial success during the 1870s and early 1880s, it was insufficient to pay off the corporate debt or to provide a return to
the stockholders. During this time, the company administrators
were successful in waging a political war2 with the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad (B&O) [Dilts, 1993]. Severe flooding in 1877
and 1889 caused major damage to the canal works. After the
1889 flood, funding was not available to make repairs, and the
C&O was forced into receivership.
Subsequently, the B&O emerged as the majority owner of
the repair bonds, holding the mortgage on the canal, and assumed control of the company. Funding provided by the B&O
allowed the canal to be repaired and returned to service in 1892;
however, another flood in 1924 resulted in the canal’s permanent
closure. In 1938, the federal government purchased the canal
assets from the B&O for $2 million [Sanderlin, 1946], and, in
1971, the canal was designated a national park.
At the time the federal government purchased the C&O
canal assets (1938), the available corporate records were also
transferred to the government and now reside at the National
Archives in the suburbs of Washington. Included among these
records were the Board of Director’s minute books and the
Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers to the Capital Stock
of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, referred to in this
paper as the stockholder minute books. Financial statements
were presented annually to the stockholders of the C&O during
the period 1829-1889, with the number of copies produced ranging from 250 to 1,000 annually. However, the annual reports for
2
The B&O and the C&O were both politically active. Both companies were
attempting to gain favors in the Maryland State Legislature. The companies in
their early histories were trying to obtain construction financing while later issues
involved other advantages, such as rate changes. (Company toll rates were set by
the legislature.)
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only five of these years reside in the National Archives. Copies of
the printed annual financial statements for all years except 1857,
1869, and 1888 were obtained from six sources (see Appendix 1).
The C&O, while never profitable for the individual investors, was economically valuable for the region it served. Ransom
[1964] argued that economic historians have focused on the
railroad as the most important factor in American economic
growth. He concluded that this emphasis is misguided and that
since canal construction in the U.S. predated the railroads, their
contribution to American economic growth should be re-evaluated. Ransom further states that canals never constituted an
integrated system and that their economic contributions should
be evaluated individually.
ACTIONS BY STOCKHOLDERS TO EFFECT CONTROL
The 1784 charter of the PC required an annual meeting of
the stockholders. The charter also included wording that at the
annual meeting the “president and directors shall make report,
and render distinct and just accounts of all their proceedings,
and on finding them fairly and justly stated, the proprietors then
present, or a majority of them, shall give a certificate thereof”
[Virginia Act, 1784, ch. XLIII]. To accomplish this charter requirement at each annual meeting, the stockholders of the PC
selected a committee of stockholders to review the annual report
of the company. At the time of the founding of the PC, there
were no corporations to emulate. The origin of the concept of
using the review committee remains unknown. However, the
Middlesex Canal Company also used the stockholders to perform the review function [Roberts, 1938].
The charter of the C&O was almost identical to that of
the PC, including the above referenced phrase. In addition to
absorbing the stockholders of the PC, the C&O also inherited
many PC practices, including the corporate governance structure. The C&O continued to have a committee review the annual
report presented by the company president and report back to
the stockholders on their findings. A separate sub-committee
was created to review (audit) the annual financial statements
presented to the stockholders.
At the 1831 annual stockholders meeting, a resolution was
passed to create the stockholder review committee at the current meeting to review next year’s annual report. The resolution
also states that the president and directors should have the
annual report prepared two weeks prior to the annual meeting
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9
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to allow the committee to review the report before the stockholders meeting. After completing the canal to Cumberland,
Maryland in 1850, the review process was again modified. A
committee of three or four stockholders present at the current
stockholders meeting would be selected to review the next year’s
annual report, replacing the committee/sub-committee structure previously employed. The committee’s main focus during
these years was the examination of the financial records of the
company. Additionally, other committees would be established
as the stockholders felt necessary to examine particular issues of
interest to the stockholders.3 The annual review committee reports presented in the stockholder minute books provide insight
into the functionality of the company’s corporate governance
structure.
WEAKNESSES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Hart [1995] explained the weaknesses and importance of
corporate governance structures. He discussed the five weaknesses in corporate governance structures identified in the introduction and provided a theoretical framework for these weaknesses. The following discussion describes these five weaknesses
and how they are illustrated by the C&O in operation.
The Cost of Agent Contracts: The costs and complexity of writing
a comprehensive agent contract are such that organizations will
only write incomplete contracts [Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny
1997]. Shleifer and Vishny describe the incomplete contract
issue with regards to the allocation of company funds. They remark that ideally a company would write a contract that specifies exactly how a manager would allocate company funding of
projects, but future contingencies are impossible to foresee or
describe. Hart [1995] argues that the potential costs of contracts
are thinking of every potential eventuality, the cost of negotiating contracts, and the cost of writing the contract so that it is
enforceable. In the case of the C&O, it was not possible to think
of every possible contingency since its stockholders were entering an unknown area. The C&O did not even have a written
contract with the corporate president. Company presidents were
elected annually at the stockholders meetings, so there were no
negotiations. The method of enforcing the stockholders’ will on
the company presidents was by replacing them at the next stock3
An example is the committee established in 1869 to investigate the option of
turning over control of the company to the bondholders.
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holders meeting.
The stockholders imposed controls on the company management by passing stockholder resolutions. As illustrated by the
changes occurring during the tenure of Arthur Gorman’s presidency. Gorman was president of the C&O from 1873 to 1883.
During his tenure, a corporate bondholder, Daniel K. Stewart,
brought a lawsuit against the company for non-payment of bond
interest. In this 1881 lawsuit [Stewart v. Chesapeake and Ohio
Canal and others], the plaintiff alleged corporate mismanagement as the reason for the non-payment. The court, while not
agreeing to place the company into receivership as requested
by the plaintiff, did agree that the company was spending extravagantly on travel and entertainment expenses. In 1879, the
stockholders had passed a resolution limiting the travel reimbursement expenses of the officers and directors of the company.
Following the lawsuit, the stockholders further limited expenditures at the 1881 stockholder meeting. The stockholders passed
a resolution that all salaries would be fixed by them and that the
company would pay no expenses for travel or hotel bills [C&O,
1856-1889, p. 332].
Hart [1995, p. 680] further states that the “governance structure can be seen as a mechanism for making decisions that have
not been specified in the initial contract.” While the stockholder
review committee did not identify the issue of excessive travel
and entertainment expenses, the stockholders of the C&O acted
to correct the issue of travel and entertainment expenses by setting limits on the amount of expenditure allowable.
Individual Stockholders are too Numerous to Effect Individual
Control: The authors of the C&O charter attempted to protect
small investors by including voting restrictions. These restrictions were one vote per share for the first ten shares held and
one vote per every five shares above ten. It was felt that at $100
par, no one individual or organization would be able to gain
control of the enterprise. However, in 1836, the State of Maryland purchased enough shares of stock to control over 50% of
the voting rights [Sanderlin, 1946]. Thereafter, each change in
the political party controlling the Maryland statehouse brought
a change in the company president and the Board of Directors.
In 1825, Maryland created a Board of Public Works. The
original purpose of the board was to oversee state investments
in corporations and to locate additional opportunities for investment as the state set out to provide income for governmental
operations without direct taxation. In 1850, Maryland created a
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9

8

ss et al.: Corporate governance in the 19th century: Evidence from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Compa
Russ et al., The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company

121

new Board of Public Works whose job was simply to represent
the state at stockholder meetings, not to exercise direct managerial control over its various investments [Wilner, 1984].
In 1850, Maryland held a constitutional convention, and
the oversight of the various state corporate investments was
an area of significant debate. Mr. Thomas, the representative
from Frederick County, commented that there was a significant
difference between Maryland and other states with respect to
its canal investments. The difference was that the internal improvements companies in other states were owned, built, and
operated by the states as non-profit entities. Canals in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio were all public enterprises. Mr. Smith of
Allegheny County said that the state had no duty other than to
attend the annual meeting and cast the state’s vote. He further
said that the state could have no supervision over the works as
the charter gives entire control to the president and directors of
the company [Wilner, 1984]. The Maryland legislature intended
the company to be independently controlled, but the intent of
the state legislature did not prevent the Board of Public Works
from making political appointments to the company presidency.
In spite of concerns about management weakness caused by
political appointments, the C&O continued operating independently until 1889, when it was finally placed into receivership.
In 1841, the stockholders, recognizing the costs of continuous changes in company management, passed a resolution that
the C&O was a national work and should not become a political
engine, fluctuating with the vagaries of Maryland’s statehouse
politics [C&O, 1836-1841, p. 414]. By the 1870s, the offices of the
company had become political perks bestowed by the political
party in charge. Arthur Gorman was appointed president 1873
as a reward for services rendered the Democratic Party [Sanderlin, 1947]. In the year Gorman was nominated as president of
the company, Maryland cast its votes for Gorman with all other
stockholder votes against. Hart [1995] explains that when company management is sufficiently bad, dissident shareholders can
initiate a proxy fight to remove the board, but that this course of
action is usually ineffective. In the case of the C&O, it was impossible for the minority stockholders to bring about change.
The minority stockholders also made attempts to gain more
influence in the company. The individual representing the stock
held by the U.S. government presented a motion to change the
method for electing members of the Board of Directors at the
June 1879 annual meeting. The proposal was for the Board of
Directors to consist of three members elected by Maryland and
Published by eGrove, 2009
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two members elected by the minority stockholders. The resolution was defeated because Maryland voted against the resolution
although all other stockholders voted for it.
Corporate bondholders also recognized the limitations occasioned by the political nature of the company. In 1881, the bondholders presented a petition at the stockholders meeting noting
that they had not received any payment since December 1876.
The petition further explained that if the company were run as
a business and free of political influences, the company would
have been able to pay the debt [C&O, 1856-1889, pp. 336-337].
O’Sullivan [2000, p. 410], commenting on innovative organi
zations and corporate governance, argued that “a system of
corporate governance supports innovation by generating three
conditions – financial commitment, organizational integration
and insider control.” Financial commitment is defined as an
institution’s resolve to continue financial support of innovation.
Organizational integration is the maintenance of human capital. Once an innovative process has started, the loss of human
capital will cost the organization additional resources. Insider
control requires that decision makers are involved in the learning/innovation process. The stockholders of the C&O were upset
by the problems of continuously changing company officers.
Subsequent to Maryland gaining control of the company, the
minority stockholders were unable to exert enough control to
force a change in policy. At the April 1841 stockholders meeting,
the review committee made the following statement to protest
the turnover of officers as a function of Maryland politics [C&O,
1836-1841, pp. 417-418]:
The committee, from evidence given them, are satisfied that very valuable and faithful officers have been
removed from the service of the company, and, in some
cases, men not competent to perform the duties required have been appointed in their places, to the serious injury of the best interest of the company.
Some of these removals have been as admitted by
the president’s report to the governor of Maryland, for
political opinions sake which, as your committee conceive, no direct interest of the company either required
or demanded.
In addition to these views already presented, there
are other matters which might be adverted to if the time
allowed for this report would permit, which go strongly
to induce this committee to believe that the affairs of
the canal company have been most unfortunately managed.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9
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The stockholders of the C&O were numerous with large
blocks of stock held by the U.S. government, the State of Virginia, and the cities of Alexandria and Georgetown. Even with
these large blocks of stock, the holders working together were
still unable to affect changes in corporate management when it
was deemed necessary.
Large Stockholders: In the presence of large shareholders, agency
problems may be reduced but not eliminated. Shareholders with
over 10% of the outstanding stock of a company have more incentive to monitor company management. A substantial minority shareholder has enough voting control to put pressure on or
even remove management [Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. A current
example would be the California retirement system (CALPERS)
that picks a few companies each year to contact about corporate
changes. Unfortunately, CALPERS is the exception not the rule.
Most large-block holders are free riders and do not monitor
company management.
Large shareholders will under-perform the monitoring
and intervention activities and may use their voting power to
improve their own position at the expense of the other shareholders [Hart, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. One reason
identified by Hart for the under-performance of large stockholders includes their using their voting power to improve their own
position at the expense of the company. Also, large stockholders
can be persuaded not to confront management in exchange for a
promise to have their shares repurchased at a premium (greenmail). Hart mentioned one additional problem with large stockholders that more clearly relates to the C&O. The problem is
that a large institutional shareholder must hire a representative
to act on its behalf. As stated above, Maryland controlled more
than 50% of the stockholder voting rights. However, aside from
selecting company management each year, the state maintained
a laissez faire attitude toward the operations of the company.
Information regarding a large stockholder working for reasons of self-interest was also illustrated by the C&O. In 1841, the
Maryland legislature passed a bill to provide additional funding
requested by the company for completion of the canal. Before
the funding was made available to the company, the stockholders
had to ratify the provisions of the bill. When the resolution was
presented for a vote at the stockholders meeting, Maryland
voted for the resolution with all other stockholders against. The
bill thus passed included a clause that the other stockholders
found objectionable. This section contained wording requesting
Published by eGrove, 2009
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that the state’s attorney general begin proceedings against the
company for failure to pay interest on previously loaned money.
Since the previous loan included a mortgage of corporate assets, the stockholders were afraid that the state would foreclose
on the company and leave them with nothing. The state ended
up lending the company the money without taking legal action
to collect amounts past due. Maryland used its voting power
to further its own agenda. Politicians of the state also used the
company to further personal political ambitions and agendas as
indicated in the previous section of the paper.
Maryland held ownership control but did not exert it dayto-day. Rather, it limited its role to appointing members of the
Board of Directors each year. At a constitutional convention, the
delegates considered taking operational control of the company,
but in the discussion of this issue, the delegates indicated that
this was beyond the scope of state government [Wilner, 1984].
Limitations of the Corporate Board of Directors: Stockholders
elect a board of directors to monitor corporate management.
In his discussion of a board of directors, Hart [1995] lists four
shortcomings of the board as a monitoring device. The first limitation is that some board members are corporate officers and
that self-monitoring is not effective. The C&O did not have corporate officers as board members so there is no illustrative evidence of this issue present. The second limitation is that board
members may not have a financial interest in the company and
therefore have little to gain by the success of the company. In the
beginning, the C&O board was populated by stockholders. All of
these individuals had a vested financial interest in the success of
the company. After Maryland acquired voting control in 1836,
board members were selected by the state for more political reasons. Most of these individuals had no financial interest in the
company. The third limitation is that board members are busy
persons and have little time for company business affairs. In the
1800s when travel was more time consuming and difficult than
today, this problem was a greater issue. The board members
were paid a salary and travel expenses (limited in 1879), but
these were political gentlemen more interested in political than
financial gains. The last limitation is that directors may owe
their positions to company management and may be more loyal
to management than to the stockholders they are to protect. In
the case of the C&O, the directors and the company president
were political appointees, selected as much for their political
party association as for their business savvy. These individuhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9
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als owed their allegiance to the president far more than to the
stockholders.
In the second half of the 19th century, the members of the
C&O Board of Directors were all political appointees. None of
the board members held company stock and, thus, had nothing
to gain personally from company success. The only gain they
would receive was political. All of these issues, in the case of the
C&O, led to the company having a Board of Directors with little
to gain by the company’s success. It is apparent from archival
evidence that President Gorman used the company to further
his own political future. Gorman hired persons and chose contractors to gain favor with the individuals he needed in the future to reach higher political office [Lambert, 1953]. After eight
years as president of the C&O, Gorman was elected to the U.S.
Senate, representing the State of Maryland. The Board of Directors owed their allegiance to the political party more than to the
C&O. For this reason, one could conclude that the board did not
monitor the actions of the company president as closely as perhaps they should have. Without close monitoring by the board of
directors, company management is free to pursue its own goals.
The following section provides a discussion of this topic and the
consequences that resulted in the case of the C&O.
Potential that Management will Pursue its Own Goals: As stated
earlier, President Gorman used his office to further his political
ambitions. Further evidence is demonstrated by the fact that
many board meetings during his tenure were held in Baltimore,
the home of the B&O, the C&O’s chief competitor. The B&O
was a rival for funding, route, and customers. Gorman spent
company money on travel, hotels, and entertainment for himself
and C&O board members to have its board meetings in Baltimore. Gorman was not a Baltimorean, the C&O offices were in
Annapolis, and the City of Baltimore and its residents provided
little, if any, support for the canal. However, Baltimore was the
center of political power in Maryland.
Existing evidence indicates that Gorman used the C&O to
further his personal ambitions. In 1880, the C&O was sued by a
holder of mortgage bonds. The lawsuit [1881] alleged that Gorman was using his position as president to further his political
ambition at the expense of the bondholders. The suit alleged
that Gorman had political agents on the company payroll and
employed numerous “worthless” persons to further his political
ambitions [Lambert, 1953].
The corporate governance issues presented by Hart [1995]
Published by eGrove, 2009
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existed in a 19th century corporation. C&O stockholders identified and addressed these corporate governance issues. It is manifestly clear that agency problem existed.
Hart argued that in the presence of agency problems and
incomplete contracts, corporate governance matters greatly.
Therefore corporate governance would be vital at the C&O
since the company did not have a contract with the corporate
president and severe agency problems existed. The next section of this paper discusses how the C&O shareholders used a
stockholder review committee to force corporate officers and
directors to address the problems presented by the limitations
on corporate governance.
STOCKHOLDER AUDIT
As mentioned previously, the C&O annually created a committee of stockholders to review the annual report of the president and directors. The Middlesex Canal of Massachusetts4 also
used stockholders to perform the audit function [Kistler, 1980].
In her article on the Middlesex Canal, Kistler revealed that the
stockholders of that company appeared to have reviewed all
transactions. However, she also noted that the review performed
in 1830 was completed in only one week and commented that it
is doubtful that much work could have been performed in such
a short period of time, leaving doubt as to the thoroughness of
the audit. The archive of the Middlesex Canal Company does not
provide any additional information about the these audit efforts.
The C&O review committee left more detailed information
regarding the thoroughness of its audit efforts. The C&O committee recognized the limitations of auditing. In 1838, the committee reviewing the annual report made the statement that it
could not review all transactions in the time period allowed, but
that this did not seem necessary since the board had approved
all requisitions for payment. Therefore, the committee reviewed
the requisitions issued for disbursements, examined the books
of the treasurer and company clerk, and found these to be satisfactory [C&O, 1836-1841, pp. 176-177].
For the year 1839, the committee, in making comments
about estimated figures on the financial statements, made this
further observation [C&O, 1836-1841, p. 291]:

4
The Middlesex Canal was a contemporary company of the C&O. The Middlesex was founded in 1793 and had a similar corporate governance structure.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss2/9

14

ss et al.: Corporate governance in the 19th century: Evidence from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Compa
Russ et al., The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company

127

From these causes the statements may be found to
require some variation but although not exact, the subcommittee are induced to believe, that they are at least
proximately correct in the available basis that they exhibit for the demands of the current year.
This limited endorsement did not keep the sub-committee from
admonishing the company officers when irregularities were encountered.
Over the life of the C&O, the stockholders reviewing the
company finances made numerous observations and recommendations. The first recommendations for change came in
1834, when the review committee requested four changes in the
manner in which the company kept records and reported to the
stockholders. The first request was that requisitions for salaries
and services state the time period for which the recipient was
receiving pay and the capacity in which the person had served
the company. The second request was that changes be made
regarding the presentation of financial statements. Previously,
for instance, the treasurer’s report consisted of one statement
showing total receipts and expenditures to date for the company.
The recommendation of the committee was to present a separate column for the current-year information. The review committee also requested that expenses for repairs be accounted for
and reported separately from expenses for canal construction.
Finally, it requested that a statement showing the volume of
goods transported on the canal be presented [C&O, 1828-1835,
pp. 361-362].
In 1839, the committee observed that the clerk’s statement
showed other receipts in the amount of $11,175.58 arising from
such things as tolls, rents, etc. collected by the several superintendents that had been subsequently used and accounted for in
the service of the company. Consequently, these receipts had not
passed through the books of the treasurer [C&O, 1836-1841, p.
289]. The review committee asked that this process be terminated and that all receipts and expenditures be passed through
(entered into) the treasurer’s books. The committee commented
that the practice of allowing superintendents to spend money
without an accounting of the money in the company records
“seems irregular and inconvenient.”
Two stockholders meetings were held in 1841. At the April
meeting, the stockholder review committee admonished the
company, claiming that the statement of debts and credits of
the company presented by the president to the stockholders was
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incorrect and could not be relied upon. The committee then
observed that it was unable to present any satisfactory view on
the financial statements [C&O, 1836-1841, pp. 415-416]. The
committee further claimed that the company bylaws required
that the company treasurer present financial reports at each
monthly board meeting and that this reporting had not been
done since the current treasurer had been in office. The committee made several statements regarding individual transactions
such as the sale of bonds issued by Maryland for stock subscriptions. The committee argued that the manner in which the sale
was handled cost the company a substantial amount of money.
As a result, the stockholders removed the company president,
treasurer, and directors from office and replaced them with a
new slate of corporate officers.
At the August 1841 stockholders meeting, the committee,

after further review of the company records, presented additional problems with the records. The committee made the observation that several irregularities in vouchers were traced to a
disregard of company policy by the former company president.
The committee also stated that during the five months leading
up to the change in officers, no accounting entries had been entered in the company books.
In 1845, the review committee made the following observation about the company’s method of bookkeeping and requested
that it be changed [C&O, 1842-1846, pp. 488-489]:
They find that under the directions given to the treasurer, and in accordance with the custom, which has heretofore prevailed in the company, payments have been
made for more than one purpose on the same warrant
and the whole payment charged under the head of the
principal item for which the warrant was drawn.
In consequence of this circumstance the abstract of
receipts into and payments from the treasury instead of
exhibiting the actual condition of the affairs of the company in its items as well as in its final balances, only
show the amount charged in the treasurer’s books under
each head in the abstract instead of the whole amount
of expenses properly chargeable under that head. Thus
under the head of pay of lockkeepers, it appears by abstract that the amount paid in 1845 was $627, whereas
by reference to the accounts of the company it is found
that the whole amount properly chargeable under this
head is $7,801.00.
In 1855, the corporate office staff was fired and replaced
with political appointees. The 1856 review committee disagreed
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with these organizational changes and stated so in their report
to the stockholders. The review committee further averred in
their report that the office staffers who had been fired were competent individuals and that their replacements were incompetent. In 1856, a new slate of corporate officers had been elected
the prior year. The new corporate officers reinstated the former
office staff and organization. The 1857 review committee commented that they were grateful to see the former organization of
corporate officers restored.
After the canal construction was completed to Cumberland,
Maryland in 1850, the review committee was less involved in
reviewing the actions of the president and directors and more
concerned with the review of the company finances. Subsequent
to 1857, the review committee made no further admonishing
remarks about the company operations or finances.5
Political Problems: As previously noted, the C&O became a politically controlled company. In this political environment, there
existed the potential for political favors to override the stockholder reviews. In 1829, the stockholders established the process
for the selection of committee members. The stockholder resolution stated that the review committee would be staffed with a
representative from Virginia, Maryland, the U.S., and the cities
of Alexandria, Washington, and Georgetown, each of which had
purchased large blocks of stock in the company. The balance
of the committee would include members selected from other
stockholders in attendance.
This stockholder audit practice continued until the company ceased to exist in 1889. During the last 30 years of the
company’s existence, no review committee reported any error or
misstatement.
In the 1881 bondholder lawsuit, the verdict provided stated
that there were excessive expenditures for travel and entertainment but that the company should not be placed into receivership. For these reasons, one is left to assume that the review
committee examined transactions to insure that the transactions
were correctly documented. It appears that the committee did
not consider the transactions to determine the legitimacy of the
expenses. A statement made by the review committee in 1837
further illustrated this point. The committee reported that the
magnitude of expenses paid and charged to the contingent fund
5
An examination by the authors of the review committee reports subsequent
to 1857 found no additional admonishing comment about the company.
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(miscellaneous expense) far exceeded that of the previous year.
After presenting the transactions that represented the greatest
amount of these expenses, the committee made the comment
that they were not charged with testing the legitimacy of the
payments and, therefore, had no opinion to render regarding the
necessity of the payments made. They further commented that
the payments were authorized by the board [C&O, 1836-1841,
p. 130]. This denial illustrates the shortcoming of the C&O’s review committee’s practice.
The practices of the review committee had the shortcoming of not identifying problems relating to the magnitude of
expenditures, but the committees did reveal and recommend
changes in internal control and company reporting practices.
The individuals performing these financial reviews were not
trained auditors, but they were still able to recognize problems
and recommend changes which the corporate officers placed
into service.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVOLUTION
The model of corporate governance that existed at C&O was
similar to other corporations during that era and beyond. Theoretically over time, capital-market investors required a reasonable accounting for the use of their capital. For example, in early
19th century development companies, such as the PC, individual
investors were directly involved in both the supply of capital and
in the management of companies. Corporate governance techniques for several of these early companies included assurance
in the charter of the publication of an annual report and the
agreement among selected shareholders to serve as members of
an audit committee [Russ et al., 2006].
Railroads and later larger corporate entities drew from an
expanding capital market made possible by communication improvements, such as the telegraph which linked cities and capital investors. Thus, individual and merchants served as “bankers” of investment funds. Interstate investment required the use
of legal vehicles such as “trusts” to assure that accountabilities
and “reasonable” control of information could be achieved. In
the last quarter of the 19th century, industrial expansion, abetted by the creation of corporate holding companies and the
rise of investment banking houses such as Morgan and Schiff,
produced a greater concentration of funds and greater public
concern regarding the management of those funds.
In states such as Massachusetts, the response was to form
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public railroad commissions, headed by leading citizens such as
Charles Frances Adams of the famous presidential family. Adams
and his brother Henry also introduced public commentary by
writing about the abuses of corporate railroad management,
such as their essay on the Erie Railroad and the alleged manipulations of this laissez faire era attributed to Gould, Fisk, and
Drew. Public concerns were addressed, in part, by the notion of
“disclosure” being required of transportation companies which
operated interstate. The Massachusetts Commission, known as
the Sunshine Commission, became the model for the Interstate
Commerce Commission, established in 1887, which required the
filing of information about the operations of carriers.
A new accounting profession launched with the passage of
the CPA designation in l896 spread across the country in the
next three decades. Disclosure, exemplified in the reports of U.S.
Steel, sought to address public concern, and journalists paid
extensive attention to corporate abuse. Collectively, these efforts
were the response to public and private concerns that capital
providers be given a reasonable accounting about the use of
their capital.
The notion of boards of directors serving as the ultimate
manager of corporations and representing individual owners,
community members, merchant bankers, and capital providers while countering the power of professional management,
became the mode as corporations in transportation and industry
continued to grow in economic importance.
Chandler [1977] documents the rise of a professional management class in the early 20th century, describing how their
power to allocate resources constituted a “visible hand” that
often, if not effectively, replaced Smith’s “invisible hand.” With
this era came a loss of proprietary involvement in major corporations and a rise of contractual management and investor relationships which can be called the “agency era” as documented
by Berle and Means [l932].
Berle and Means’ work began a modern era of public concern over the relationships among capital providers, proprietors,
and managers, well documented in the writings of Shleifer and
Vishny [1997]. From the beginning of the 19th century through
the rise of agency governance concerns, a core theoretical concern remained to provide for a reasonable accounting for the
use of their capital. During this time period, the corporate governance structure remained essentially the same. The greatest
change over the 200 years of history was the increasing distance
between the stockholders and management.
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SARBANES OXLEY
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
in response to corporate failures including, most prominently,
Enron and WorldCom. SOX was designed to, among other
things, strengthen corporate governance. While SOX has made
some statutory changes to our corporate governance system
and strengthened the board of directors, issues still remain.
SOX does not eliminate the agency problem of corporate management, but it does make corporate management criminally
liable for corporate reporting. Individual stockholders are still
unable to exert control over the companies that they own, while
large stockholders are not required to monitor the companies in
which they hold stock. SOX has made improvements, but there
is still much room for corporate governance issues to arise.
It will take time before it can be known if SOX has had an
effect on corporate governance today. In the case of the C&O,
there are some areas where SOX could have made a difference.
In the later years of the company, the stockholder review committee did the job and made no comments. The largest corporate governance failure at the C&O appears to have been during
the 1870s when President Gorman ran the company to feather
his own nest as much as to enhance the well-being of the company. Gorman was elected to the U.S. Senate while serving as
president of the company. The corporate bondholders sued the
company in 1881, alleging that the company was being used to
further his political ambitions. The corporate responsibility section of SOX requires company management to be held responsible for the company’s financial statements. No one questioned
the financial statements of the C&O; however, the bondholders
did question the financial management of the company. If SOX
had been in place in the 1870s, it could have encouraged the
directors to a greater diligence in policing the expenditures of
President Gorman.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Corporate governance as it existed in the early 19th century
has not changed significantly from what exists today. While the
distance between stockholders and management has increased
over time, corporations have always been faced with managing
absentee ownership and the related concerns surrounding the
provision of proper assurance and disclosure.
This paper provides support for the theoretical framework
of corporate governance presented by Hart [1995] by presenting
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evidence from a 19th century company. In this regard, the issues
presented by Hart are not considered new, but were manifested
and were acted upon in an early corporation. In this paper, a
“modern” theory was applied to a 19th century company. A
theory of this nature, or any other theory, should stand the tests
of time, tested by both contemporary and historical data. If
the concept stands up to the tests of time, then it gains in acceptance; when it fails the tests of time, it loses acceptance. Are
matters relating to 19th governance comparable to the modern
era? Theoretically, they are the same issues. The first corporations struggled with the idea of absentee ownership as corporations do today. The example used in this paper is of a company
struggling to develop a corporate governance system that would
be taken for granted today. The founders of this company did
not have a roadmap to follow in starting the corporation. The
PC/C&O was one of the first American corporations.
In summary, Hart states that agent contracts cannot be
comprehensively written. The C&O did not have an employment
contract with the president of the company. The stockholders
controlled the president’s actions by resolutions made at the annual stockholders meetings. As new issues arose, the stockholders adopted new resolutions to restrict or control the president.
Second, Hart felt that when individual stockholders are too
numerous, a failure to exert control over the actions of corporate officers exists. In the late 1700s, the PC/C&O established
a corporate governance structure similar in many ways to the
structure used today. One difference between the C&O’s and
modern structures is the use of independent auditors to review
the finances of the company today. The C&O used a committee
consisting of stockholders to perform the audit function and to
review the actions of the president and Board of Directors.
Third, Hart contended that large stockholders will “free
ride” instead of actively participate in the monitoring of corporate management. In the case of the C&O’s largest stockholder,
Maryland, participation in corporate management was no
greater than the participation of other stockholders, even with
Maryland’s much larger investment to protect. The state not only
failed to monitor at a level associated with the investment at
risk but allowed company management to pursue political gains
at the company’s expense. President Gorman was accused of
using the company to further his own political career. In the
lawsuit brought by a bondholder alleging mismanagement, the
court did not find mismanagement but found only that the company was spending unnecessary money. The court did not give
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control to the bondholders but did appoint a court monitor to
review future company spending.
Next, Hart [1995] presented four limitations of a board of
directors. This paper provides support for three of the four limitations: board members may not have a financial interest in the
company, board members have little time for company affairs,
and directors may owe their position to company management.
After Maryland gained controlling interest of the company, the
C&O Boards of Directors were selected based on political party
affiliation rather than for business reasons. Each subsequent
change in the majority political party in the statehouse resulted
in a new president and Board of Directors. For this reason, the
board members were not stockholders and had no financial interest in the success of the company. The board was more loyal
to the company president (a fellow political appointee) than to
the company stockholders. The actions of the board, while not
explored in this paper, were probably more politically than profit
motivated for the reasons set forth above.
The last corporate governance issue presented by Hart
is that the potential exists for managers to pursue their own
interest at the expense of the company. In his paper describing Arthur Gorman as a political party boss, Sanderlin [1947]
observed that Gorman used his position as president of the
C&O for his own political gain. The 1881 bondholder petition
provides additional support for the case that the presidents of
the C&O used the office for political purposes. As stated, it is felt
that Gorman used his position as the company president to assist in his election to the U.S. Senate [Sanderlin 1947].
Shleifer and Vishny [1997] write that most advanced market
economies have reasonably solved the problem of corporate
governance, but this does not mean that the current systems
of corporate governance cannot be improved. The issues raised
by Hart indicate weaknesses in the corporate governance structure used today. Examples of today’s corporate failures provide
evidence that improvements could and should be made. In the
U.S., more requirements are being made for outside directors
to strengthen corporate governance. Maybe we can learn from
history and find additional solutions to corporate governance
problems that have been lost in time. In the U.S., the distance
between managers and providers of capital increases the agency
problem [Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. Managers have greater discretionary power over the allocation of corporate resources than
might otherwise be the case if owners were actively involved in
corporate affairs.
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In the case of the C&O, the stockholder review committee
gave the providers of capital, the stockholders, a more active
involvement in corporate management. Since companies that
draw on the experience of the stockholders will be more efficient
[O’Sullivan 2000], the model of a stockholder review committee
utilized by the C&O might well be utilized in corporate governance today.
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APPENDIX 1
List and Location of Annual Reports for the Chesapeake
and Ohio Canal Company for the Period of this Study:
1829-1889
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Year
1829*
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858

Location
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
Library of VA
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
UVA
MD Law Library
UVA
Report not located
UVA

Number
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Year
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889

Location
UVA
UVA
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
UVA
MD Law Library
NARA
UVA
UVA
Report not located
U Mich
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
Madison
MD Law Library
Madison
MD Law Library
Madison
Madison
Madison
Madison
Madison
Madison
MD Law Library
Madison
Report not located
NARA

NARA: National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
MD Law Library: Maryland State Law Library, Annapolis, Maryland
Library of VA: The Library of Virginia, Richmond Virginia
UVA: The University of Virginia Library
Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society
U Mich: University of Michigan
* The C&O broke ground in 1828, and the first annual report was presented at the
end of the first year of operations in 1829.
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